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Consciousness and Complexity: the CognitiveQuestDonald PerlisDepartment of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742(301) 405-2685perlis@cs.umd.eduAbstractSome implications of the view that mind is a suitably complex kind ofprocess are investigated in various contexts. The underlying theme is that thebehavior of complex systems cannot be adequately judged by that of simplesystems. I rst present a personal exploration of the mechanistic account ofmind in terms of non-technical considerations; then I present and criticize someideas of Kripke, Nagel, and Jackson that challenge the mechanistic view. NextI turn to a brief synopsis of some of Dennett's recent ideas. Finally I oer somecritical comments on Dennett's views and suggest possible modications.1 IntroductionMy topic is the thesis that the mind is a machine, or at least that it consists of certainaspects of the working of a suitable machine (such as the brain).1 Among other things,It is a great pleasure to me, to be able to dedicate this essay to Jack Minker in celebration ofhis 65th birthday and of the many contributions he has made in research, in human rights, and ineducation (of students and colleagues alike). May he continue with us at the University of Marylandfor many more productive years! I would like to say, on a personal note, that in my early yearshere as a naive oundering young assistant professor (well, not so young, but certainly naive andoundering) I was|in Jack's colorful phrasing|a \dead duck"; until, that is, Jack took me underhis wing and educated me in how to carry on a vigorous research program. He got me interested incircumscription; co-authored papers with me; showed me how to isolate open problems; write grants;take bad reviews constructively; and eventually he weaned me into a live duck! Jack: thanks, verymuch.1We can try to make this a little more concrete by characterizing a machine as a complex ofsimple parts interacting according to simple laws. Then mind, if it is a machine, arises from thecomplexities of the particular overall architecture of the interacting parts.2
I will discuss some ideas in the important new book by Daniel Dennett, ConsciousnessExplained [1991]. To glance ahead, Dennett suggests that consciousness should beregarded as a special kind of report, what we might call a narrative self-history,produced out of a highly complex, parallel and uctuating conglomerate of processes.2I begin with some very general thoughts on the cognitive science enterprise, and thenmove to some objections, addressing in particular ideas of Kripke, Nagel, and Jackson;and then I point out some aspects of Dennett's approach.2 The cognitive quest: some general considera-tionsWill we ever understand the mind? Can the mind possibly be intelligible in termsof physical processes, as a kind of machine? I will discuss some specic claims andcounterclaims in the following sections. First, I want to explore uninhibitedly somethoughts related to the prospect of understanding ourselves and in so doing changingour very concept of ourselves.We may get to the point of knowing enough about ourselves to be able to makemajor changes in what we are, we may control our own future, our evolution. Wealready do this in small ways today, e.g., by body-building, by education, by medicine.But we may someday be able to choose much more profound aspects of our being,and, even more exciting, we may thereby come to see entire ways of being that todaytotally elude us! We may nd that we are merely a rather minor form of consciousnessin a vast spectrum of possibilities waiting for us to grow into them.The dull robots of today's factories are a very poor image for this prospect, and itinvites confusion to use the same words (robot, computer, machine) for these as forthe future scenario of ourselves I am suggesting. But in another sense the words areappropriate, just as chemistry is an appropriate term for describing the basis for life.It is chemistry, but a rather fantastic version of it not suspected until rather recently,one that puts 19th century chemistry to shame as a dull dead aair. In the same senseI think that the possibilities for machines will turn out to be even more dramatic andwe will see that we are not only chemical in nature but also mechanical|yet thiswill not detract from our wonderfulness at all, any more than chemistry has. We willnd that we are wonderful soft machines, and this will attest to the amazing qualitiesmachines can have: they can be as wonderful as us: they are us! It is just that so farwe have not come to realize the incredible range of things machines can be, we haveat present only rather pitiful examples, just as people of the past had only pitifulexamples of what chemistry could be.One aspect of this is the study of complex systems, something we have little2I submit that we have an excellent example in our guest of honor, Professor Jack Minker. For heis clearly conscious, baingly complex, and possesses a distinguished 65-year narrative self-history!3
experience with so far. Few would contest that the mind is a highly complex system.Yet we know little of how complex systems work; from a description of the (workingsof the) parts an understanding of the whole is not at all immediate.It may be fair, then, to characterize articial intelligence as a branch of the generalscience of complex systems. Yet complex systems, as we are discovering in biologyand now in so-called chaotic systems, are far richer than we had previously suspected.The mind may well prove to be the most complex (and correspondingly rich) of all.3 Some technical objections consideredStandard objections to mind-as-machine typically fail to take account of the implicitnotion that any such machine will be incredibly complex, and consequently mayhave features that cannot be foreseen merely by analogy with comparatively simplesystems. This is what we shall look into in the remainder of this paper.3.1 Pains and brainsToward the end of his book Naming and Necessity [1980], Saul Kripke presents anargument against the mind-brain identity thesis, i.e., he argues that brain processin itself cannot be mind, nor in particular can it constitute experiential phenomenasuch as pain. I will try to summarize what I think is the gist of his argument, callingattention to features that are not completely explicit in his presentation.Let us suppose that an experiential phenomenon, say a felt pain, were in factnothing more than a kind of brain process. Now, the brain is largely composed ofneurons, which either re or do not at any given time. Suppose that a particular setof neurons in an organism's brain|the \pain" neurons|are the ones whose ringsamount precisely to the phenomenon of felt pain, as experienced by that organism.3But the set of pain neurons could in principle re in isolation, detached from a wholebrain or anything else, in which case there'd be no feeler to experience the pain, hencethere is no felt pain. Contradiction.4But this argument has two hypotheses: a general one (the identity thesis) and aspecic one (about a specic set of \pain" neurons). The latter one is the one beingrefuted, and the former is left for us to feel suspicious of. Let us restate Kripke's3Kripke speaks of C-bers. In fact, C-bers are not in the brain at all but are slow-carriers(along with fast carriers, A-delta-bers) of `pain signals' from portions of the body to the spinalcord. The spinal cord relays these signals to the brain, especially to the thalamus region, wheresome have speculated that actual pain sensation may occur. The thalamus of course is made ofbers too, including billions of neurons. See Dennett [1978] for philosophically weird facts about thepain mechanism and Nichols et al [1992] for some more technical background.4Kripke says (p. 153{154): \to make the C-ber stimulation correspond to [felt] pain, God mustdo something in addition to the mere creation of C-ber stimulation...the stimulation could existwithout the pain." 4
argument in terms suitable to our analysis. There are two implicit assumptions weneed to draw out.First, the argument tacitly assumes the set of pain neurons is a rather small portionof the brain, so that it is implausible that they alone constitute a kind of brain ableto have experiences. That is, their ring must be a very isolable phenomenon; andwe can agree I think that no mere dozen or hundred neurons will suce to constitutea kind of personhood able to feel pain.5Second, the argument assumes that if felt pains are brain states, then they arerings of certain bers, since the brain is made up of bers (neurons and other tissue).But Kripke shows that this (together with the rst assumption) is incoherent, andconcludes then that brain states cannot be pain-feeling.However, it may be that pain is not local to a small set of bers, and also it may bethat no particular set of ber-rings constitute pain; it may be temporal patterns ofneuronal behavior, rather than any particular set of neurons. Such patterns could beat any level of organization at or above the neuronal level. It may be|and Kripke'sargument seems to lend support to this|that pain and other mental states can onlyoccur at a very high organizational level, maybe even involving most of the brain, andthat at this level pain is not isolable, i.e., it cannot happen apart from the personalitythat it is an aspect of. The feeling of pain may be a process over time, not a singleinstantaneous battery of rings, and constituting the recognition of something ashappening to one's self. For an analogy, we cannot isolate the surface tension fromthe ocean, nor the primality of 5 from the natural numbers. Pain may not be so much\where" or \which" neurons re, as \how" they re. Certain variations in the ringpatterns across billions of neurons constituting our consciousness may constitute thepresence of pain in that consciousness.6This is precisely the complex-systems contention. A highly complex system mayhave all sorts of unexpected properties, and we should not assume in advance thatthere are no surprises in store. But there is a valuable insight to be gained fromKripke's argument: Pain (and mind in general) cannot be a small system.7Maybe the whole brain does constitute a feeler, a conscious agent. Indeed that iswhat the identity thesis claims. In fact, by not recognizing the essential assumption5The previous footnoted quote from Kripke I think clearly indicates that he takes the stimulationof pain neurons to be far less than the full normal stimulation of the entire brain. For simply re-readthe quote with \full normal brain stimulation" replacing \C-ber stimulation"; more on this below.6To speak of those variations isolated from underlying patterns is meaningless. And to deny thatthe whole brain's neuronal ring patterns can be consciousness is simply to beg the question of theidentity thesis rather than to make an argument against it.7This is not to say that there is no localization of function in the brain. Far from it: manyprocesses are highly localized, but apparently those that constitute consciousness are less so. Thusmuch early (low level) visual processing occurs in various stages between the retina, lateral geniculatenucleus, and back of the brain (area V1). But these local processes do not in themselves constitutesight: an individual having only those portions of brain (and the brainstem, necessary to supportautonomic functions) will not be conscious at all, let alone have visual awareness.5
of smallness in his ber-argument, Kripke does leap to the conclusion that no brainstructure at all can constitute mind. But his argument itself, without this unjustiedleap, in no way undermines the identity thesis. Rather it gives us new informationabout what must follow from it: that mind (and feeling) is a global property of thebrain, and highly local events in themselves cannot constitute conscious (cognitiveor mental) events. (This is not to say that the entire brain must be involved in anyone feeling; but it does say that a suciently large and complex part to produce apersonal subject is needed.)The tendency to make a claim about a system as a whole, based only on an in-dividual accounting of isolated|local|parts, leads often to an extrapolation fallacy:assuming that what can be seen to hold about small numbers of parts must alsobe seen about large numbers of parts. Complex systems may admit higher-orderphenomena not readily described in lower-level terms.What then about the thalamus and pain-bers in the brain? According to ouranalysis, the actual experience of pain|felt pain|can occur only as a state of afeeling being. Thus the thalamus in and of itself in a certain state cannot be whatpain is unless the thalamus itself constitutes a feeling agent, something no one at thispoint seems prepared to say. However, the thalamus is constituted of billions of bers(neurons), so that this is not out of the question.3.2 Brain, knowledge, and experienceThomas Nagel and Frank Jackson have argued that science does not provide us withcertain kinds of information, namely knowledge of what subjective experience is like.Nagel argues, for instance, that all our detailed examinations of a bat's brain will stillleave us in the dark as to what it is like to be a bat.He may be right, in that a bat's brain is very complex, far too complex for anunaided human brain to keep track of all that is going on; there will probably be verymany important patterns of activity that we cannot see, even in principle, withoutsophisticated detection and memory aids. But perhaps with such aids, which maynot yet have been invented, we would indeed be able, in eect, to relive the bat'sexperiences and thus come to know what it is like to be a bat. Nagel wants to denythis.Now suppose, as Nagel permits us to do, that we nd out what bat feelings are,in ordinary scientic terms. Then we do not necessarily know what those feelings feellike. But I want to argue that we might, the long way around. It may be a littlelike empathizing with an unusual character in a well-written novel, where the authorhas to go to some lengths to draw the appropriate picture for us.8 We of course haveto be able to follow it, and this may tax our memory and attention and so on, tothe point that we may need mechanical memory aids. It may even, in the case of8An anonymous referee has suggested novels by men about women, and vice versa, as relatedexamples. 6
bats, require us to use batty memories temporarily, to be able to hold onto the largenumber (suppose) of sounds all at once.This is not cheating. The same holds for many things we understand or know.Cloud formation, for instance, is only understood by us in a vague and approximateway, but not because of any profound ontological features; rather, simply becauseclouds are so complex as to defy detailed analysis by us. So we use simplifyingmathematical assumptions instead, and point to that. If we want to grasp the processof cloud formation as it really is, we would need to enlarge our short-term memoriesenormously to allow us to account for each droplet of water vapor all at once, andall higher-level cloud structures too. Swirls of mist, pressure gradients, and so on,are real enough, but hard to think of without special training. Maybe we need toformalize a very fancy language for the study of complex systems, something a bitlike the powerful set theories of mathematical logic.Scientic understanding is a function of how rich, how expressive a language thescientists use, or are able to use. Perhaps all \elementary" events can be described interms of addition and subtraction alone, and thus in some very real sense a sciencebased on these operations alone would be able in principle to describe everything. Yetsuch a science would leave out any kind of direct description of multiplication, primenumbers, logarithms, calculus, clouds, wave motion, non-linearity; these concepts areat a higher level of description, requiring a richer, higher-order language. Indeed,scientic progress is often progress in language, in conceptual vocabulary. And nodoubt our brains have limits here. But this need not be an in-principle limitation.A related illustration is visio-numerical apprehension (\subitization"). Most peo-ple can judge the number of a pile of up to four objects without explicit counting.The visual system seems to do this automatically. But only a very few can do it for10 or more objects. What does it feel like to have the latter ability? We may somedayunderstand in total detail just what the ability is, in terms of brain structure. Butthis will not necessarily let us (mere 4-apprehenders) have the feeling.This sounds to be in support of Nagel. In part, yes. I claim that a typical factabout feeling like something (a bat, or a 10-apprehender) is very complex, too complexto grasp in its entirety without special purpose equipment. That is, understanding isitself constrained by the brain's hardware. We rely on approximate or fuzzy versionsof complex things when we try to understand them. To feel like a bat one needs therelevant aspects of a bat's hardware. But this is not to say that science cannot giveus this knowledge (this feeling). It can, if we are prepared to use crutches to aid ourbrains. And why not? Why should we view science as limited to what the unaidedhuman brain can accomplish?Consider an example due to Frank Jackson: Mary lives in a black-&-white roomand sees no colors but has access to complete scientic knowledge, including knowl-edge about wavelengths of light and about people's eyes and brains outside her room,and can gure out all facts (so the story goes) expressible in the language of science.Jackson claims that Mary will not know what it is like to see color. But this precisely7
begs the question, for how are we to know that all the facts do not include color sen-sation facts?|that is, if we do not limit Mary to just elementary facts, rather thanhigh-level conceptual constructs built out of those facts on the basis of her (assumedperfect) ability to conceptualize, abstract, synthesize, etc.Perhaps a suitably detailed account of the neurophysiology and cognitive phe-nomenology of seeing red, would produce in Mary the experience of seeing red thelong way around [Perlis 1978]: instead of it coming to her through her eyes andvisual cortex it might come through other avenues, but might be color experiencenonetheless.3.3 No way to say itHere is a perhaps more familiar way to think about the previous section. It also leadsinto a consideration of Dennett's work in the next section.Sometimes one hears statements to the eect that a given expression E in, say,English, simply cannot be said in French; there's no word or even concept in Frenchthat corresponds to the content of E. This is probably false, at least if we are broadenough in our perspective. For natural languages are not static things, in fact theycontain their own means for enlargements, new words, new concepts. And it takes acompetent speaker time to adapt to such changes. But upon successful adaptation,the new concept no longer seems top-heavy with denitional baggage. What mightbegin in French as a very long explanation of E, including verbal and ostensive exam-ples, ends up|after much practice|as a simple F: it has been assimilated. Then Fitself is part of the material the speaker can draw on for making reports to others|orindeed to herself.Much the same sort of thing might be the case for Mary, for subitization, andfor bat-mimicry. After much top-heavy explanation, one might start to form theappropriate connections to eventually get it \right." Or, one might not. The viewpropounded here is that this will depend solely on the mental material, the braincapacity to form those connections. That is, it will depend on the ability to processa suciently rich structure of interrelated facts of the matter, into a new conceptualstructure that one can draw on. It does not depend on access to a non-scientic,non-rational realm.Of course, to argue like this is not to prove, nor even to amass evidence. At best,it is to provide encouragement to look further, harder, in this, the decade of the brain,and on into the coming century of the mind.8
4 Dennett's contributionIt is impossible here to adequately summarize Dennett's enormous contribution inhis new book, Consciousness Explained. He incorporates in one coherent view|andpainstakingly analyzes|a wealth of psychological, philosophical, and computationaldata. I will just single out a few highlights.One key datum Dennett cites is the variation on apparent-motion experiments dueto Kolers and von Grunau. Here a subject is presented rst with, say, a red light for150 milliseconds and then after 50 milliseconds of no light, with a second green light,say to the left of the rst light. The subject reports seeing not two lights ashing insuccession but one moving light, which changes color halfway along its motion fromright to left. On being questioned, the subject insists on not having seen stationaryashing lights.Does the subject rst experience a stationary light and then re-experience it asmoving|forgetting the original experience|or simply experience it as moving fromthe rst? Dennett calls these alternative explanations Orwellian and Stalinesque,respectively:Orwellian: Event E is experienced and then all memory of E is replaced by a falserevision E0, so that the original E is no longer part of the agent's awareness or recall.Stalinesque: Event E occurs but before it can be experienced, E0 interferes and isexperienced instead. This false revision is the only one that reaches consciousness.He argues persuasively that no ingenious variation on the experiment could distin-guish between these competing explanations. He then urges us to accept the view thatthere is no deeper matter of fact about this: that experience is not a real phenomenonapart from the reports the experimenter captures from the subject. This approachhe calls heterophenomenological methodology, which I paraphrase loosely here: weshould focus on what subjects report, and take that as an operational denition ofexperience. Don't ask about something \real" underlying the report, for if we do allwe will nd is a sea of multiple drafts of reports in progress, with no distinguishedone that has any claim to being more conscious than others.9 There is no single realtrain of thought, at least not until an actual external report is fashioned. Until thisreport is done, there are merely competing processes.On the other hand, he also speaks of a self-model the subject has, and hints thaton the basis of such the subject may internally report her own narrative history,what we might call a \narrative self-history". Indeed, this is what the experimenter'sreport often sounds like, and how we often describe ourselves: as embodying singlethought-streams.10 Moreover, Dennett argues that out of the sea of multiple drafts9In this, Dennett echoes Minsky [1985].10On self-models, it is of interest that the cortex of the human (mammal) brain has a \sensori-motor" strip, consisting of roughly one billion neurons, that is hardwired to much of the body'smuscles and skin, in just two of several relatively permanent bodily self-maps. Thus it appears9
of work-in-progress, arises a virtual mind (in the computer sense), but that whereto place the boundaries on the mind (what is mind and what is not, even within anindividual's manifold drafts) is largely a matter of no real import: you can draw theline where you like, and there are no (and can be no) empirical grounds for choosing.I think that although he has come up with some wonderful, powerful, and illumi-nating tools for the study of the mind, he goes a bit too far in this latter claim ofarbitrariness of boundary. For the very narrative self-history that he holds up as thehallmark of the mental seems to me to oer some real possibility of empirical ground-ing. What if neuroscientists discover, for instance, a brain mechanism that forms anarrative self-history, and then determine that in the apparent-motion experimentsin fact there is a \xed ashing light" report fully formed in the narrative self-historybefore the second light ashes, only to be erased totally after the second ash. Thisis indeed distinct from the alternate scenario in which no such initial report arrivesin the narrative self-history and the rst such is the one with a moving light. Therst scenario supports the Orwellian position, the second the Stalinesque. (A mostpleasing outcome might be the Stalinesque one, in a discovery that it takes more timeto form a narrative self-history than can be done in the duration of an Orwellianpreamble; then at least we would not be fooled about our own experiences.) All thatsuers in this account is the very heterophenomenological methodology that Dennetthas introduced. It may give way to neuroscience. And once neuroscientists start tond structures and processes along the lines of narrative self-histories, I think we willbe well on our way to a robust science of cognition.Perhaps the narrative self-history itself might appropriately form the boundary ofconsciousness|Dennett almost says as much himself, but then pulls away with thedisclaimer that the self is after all only a ction. But what if it is not a ction? Whatif there really is a process that does exactly what the narrative self-history is supposedto do? (We are talking computations now, not qualia.) And then either a stationaryashing light gets into the history or it does not. There need not be multiple draftsat this level. There is a nal draft, namely the one that, in ideal conditions, wouldbecome part of the heterophenomenological record.Indeed, water waves and operating systems are not merely useful ctions, they arereal, even though they are not readily described in \reduced" terms (water moleculesor bits). So why should narrative self-reports be any less real? If the brain \really"provides such, then it is real.Suppose agent g is attached to a \cerebroscope" that reveals whatever scientistswant to know about the workings of g's brain. Suppose a process \NSH" is foundin g's brain, that plays the role of narrative self-history: it monitors g's behavior inmany ways, it is accessed by other processes in g's brain that then give rise to speechproduction, etc. Suppose further that we have worked out a reliable intentionality forelements in NSH, so that we can associate external content with those elements. Nowthat the brain is built in such a way as to treat the self as special, not merely another part of theenvironment. See Perlis [1978,87,90,91, and forthcoming] for uses of self-models in AI.10
we see on the cerebroscope that an element with content P has just formed in NSH.We ask g what she was just thinking, and she tells us \P"|or at least somethingwe recognize as expressing the content P. At some point, we might start to simplytrust the cerebroscope's reporting on the status of the NSH, and stop questioning theagent in addition. In fact, if the agent is for some reason unable to report to us inany customary way, so that we must rely on the cerebroscope, mightn't we be fairlycomfortable in the assessment that g nevertheless really did think \P"?|especiallyif some time later g regains speech and assures us that she had indeed been thinkingjust that!The virtual informational level of the narrative self-report is very real indeed. Wedo not delude ourselves|as Dennett suggests|that we have minds. We really dohave minds, and Dennett has taken important steps to show us how.In several later papers Dennett (e.g., [1993a]) elaborates further, along lines per-haps closer to the view espoused here, and oers the following helpful analogy: thereis no precise point in time when the British Empire rst knew of the signing of thetreaty in the War of 1812. The analogy is that an empire is a bit like a mind: madeup of multiple and conicting parts and tendencies. Thus parts of the Empire knew ofthe treaty before other parts; it is not clear what would count as The Empire \really"coming to know something. In the same way, it may not be clear what counts as\really" seeing a red dot, as opposed to processing red-dot retinal inputs in numerousways. Yet it seems that over time|and on occasion|even an Empire can get itscollective act together and arrive at a collective salience or consensus. Might nota similar neural salience occur in the brain and amount to what we call conscious-ness? Dennett [1993b] calls such a salience \cerebral celebrity" but still disparagesthe thought that this can have a precise temporal boundary.It may not be useful to quibble over milliseconds of precision in a boundary.Maybe there is an interim period of, say, 50 milliseconds during which an NSH recordis in the process of forming, and whether or not we regard it as truly in consciousexperience in that period is moot: maybe we can only report such an interim ex-perience in cases where we have it afterwards, consistent with both Orwellian andStalinesque interpretations. But maybe not; maybe clever cerebroscopic techniquecan tell the dierence. Nevertheless, precise boundary or not, NSH may constitutereal consciousness.A caveat: our lesson from Kripke suggests that NSH cannot be conned to anysmall piece of brain. It is better thought of as a process involving large portionsof brain: it is the constantly self-updating structure of internal cognition-reports,though whatever neural form that may take is still very much unknown. It is beyondthe pandemonium11 of multiple drafts, and in the realm where, for instance, decisionscan be made; the latter require commitment by the whole organism and thus havethe requisite salience.11See Selfridge [1959]; this is an early precursor of the multiple draft idea.11
5 Conclusions and a formal approachHas Dennett solved the problem of mind? No, certainly no more than the earlybiologists who began to take a chemical basis for heredity seriously had solved theproblem of life. But they did discover a crucially important route to investigate, whichdid lead substantially to a solution (still being worked out today). Perhaps Dennetthas helped us toward a similarly important key regarding complex systems. Andjust as there turned out to be highly complex molecules with utterly unsuspectedproperties (e.g., self-reproduction), there may turn out to be highly complex self-reporting systems, with properties we still do not appreciate.In the attempt to explain the phenomenon of life, the very concept evolved andeventually gave way to a rather dierent view involving peculiar and previously unsus-pected molecules with properties no chemist had dreamed of prior to 1920 or so. Thesemolecules allowed a new conception of the biological realm, one in which the usualnotions of living things (as involving heredity, reproduction, survival, metabolism,development, and so on) retained important roles but now as consequences of thenew, deeper view. And as a result it became less compelling to look for a denitivedenition of the term \life" since it was seen that this term was too vague to dojustice to the complex and detailed new view that was unfolding.Similarly, the notions of mind and consciousness may give way to a deeper view,in which familiar cognitive attributes (feelings, thoughts, desires, self, etc.) maystill retain roles but derivative of (and less precise than) the new view. It is notclear that this is what Dennett thinks. Nevertheless, I think Dennett may well havetaken us a key step along the route toward a robust science of cognition. Perhapshis suggestion of mind as a virtual self composed of a narrative report evolving outof multiple \drafts" of information processing, when explored with the sharp toolsof neuroscience as well as those of cognitive psychology, will reveal new and excitingworlds as yet undreamed of. Although others have made related suggestions, Dennetthas been the rst to oer a sustained and coherent analysis of such a view, and tiedit rmly to research ndings in the various cognitive sciences.So, where are we with respect to complex systems? We now have computers withthousands of processors. But the human brain has upwards of 100 billion neurons|some even say as many as one trillion! Even the humble praying mantis has on theorder of 100,000 neurons.12 Moreover, mind does not come in small isolable parts; noris it describable in isolable terms. It is a whole, in the sense of a complex system, andwe so far have only limited experience in understanding such systems. But computersystems do provide some experience here, especially in the notion of a virtual level of12This varies according to the species of mantis, and according to sex: mantis society is highlysexually-dimorphic, and female-dominated. The mantis has sophisticated visual, motor and auditorysystems, allowing her to stalk prey and avoid predators. It is of interest that the female mantis iscannibalistic: she nds mantises tasty; and yet she never munches on herself, indicating a robustself-model. Whether the mantis brain has sensori-motor self-maps as do mammals is not known,but it is a good guess. 12
explanation. (See [Cole 1991] for more on virtual systems and mind.)In sum, many of the arguments against the mind-brain complex-systems thesisfail to take proper account of the unexpected behaviors that may occur in a complexsystem. Indeed, there seems to be no way to take account of these behaviors exceptby actually discovering them: by doing the hard work of guring out the details.However, plausibility arguments can be given, and Dennett has made a valiant andvery worthwhile eort here.I have avoided use of a plethora of \isms" in the above discussion, but it mightbe worth pointing out that they include some traditional ones and some new ones;dualism, isolationism, reductionism, indescriptivism, eliminativism, virtualism, andctionalism are some of the themes we have seen here. But I think that a properappreciation of the wonders of complex systems will show that good old reductionistphysicalism/realism is as strong as ever. In fact, Dennett's ctionalism I think reallypaves the way for a revitalized brain realism. But it will be a virtual or emergentbrain realism, a new kid on the block. Exciting times lie ahead!What can we learn from this? How can it help us reach an understanding ofcognition, from below (neuroscience) or above (formal commonsense reasoning)? Oneobvious suggestion is to look for narrative self-histories, whether in the brain or informal programs. The latter eort is already at least implicit in non-monotonicreasoning [Ginsberg 1987], where a kind of meta-inference is made to the eect that,since :P has not been proven, then we conclude as a default that P . Here theobservation or inference that we have not proven :P is a kind of introspection of selfin a very raried sense: the \self" is simply the logic.Recent work [Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis 1990, Kraus et al 1990, Miller and Perlis1993] has pursued this idea further, by introducing \active" time into formalisms, toallow for the evolution of an explicit self-history. This in turn has allowed us to solveproblems not even expressible in classical logics.13 In [Miller 1993] particular active-(or step-) logics are identied in which an inconsistency appearing at one step canbe dissipated at a later step. Ongoing work involves a \network" of information thatgives rise to beliefs but itself is not constituted of beliefs, reminiscent of Dennett'smultiple drafts. The long-range goal of this eort is the creation of an embodiedinference mechanism, with an ongoing narrative self-history that it can reason about,including its own body and actions. The fact that its very reasoning adds to thehistory|and therefore increases time as measured in that history|is key, and is thechief distinguishing feature of active-logics to date.13That is, if the theorems of the logic are identied with the beliefs of the reasoning agent beingmodeled. 13
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